### Plan Text

#### The Republic of Turkey will prohibit the production of nuclear power.

### Adv 1 = accidents

#### Turkey’s building nuclear power plants now – high risk of meltdown, accidents, and biodiversity loss.

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In Turkey, we the opponents of nuclear energy often raise the question: How? How can it be “national”? Turkey has no nuclear background, no information , no educated personnel, no appropriate uranium reserves, no law, no infrastructure, no rules on radioactivity, no regulations and no safety law related to radioactivity. Let me remind you once more that in Turkey labor law and regulations are not definitely applied when the rules are considered as costly by employers. After Soma coal mine accident it was understood that the employer refrained himself from taking precautions or making evacuation plans in case of an accident. According to the Turkish government’s publicly announced policy, there are plans for 3 nuclear power plants. One of them is Akkuyu, the other is Sinop project, plus there is one more called with the name of Igneada. But for now, only the first 2 are on table . First in 2010 May, Turkish Government made an agreement with Russian Government to have one nuclear power plant built in Mersin/ Akkuyu (at Mediterranean sea coast) . In the agreement it is written that the installed power capacity will be 4800 MW (with each 1200 MW 4 reactors) and this power plant is introduced to provide 5% of Turkey’s electrics need. The kind of reactor Mersin-Akkuyu is VVER-1200 and will be built by Russian public company Rosatom. Under the agreement, Turkey agrees to lend his field as Rosatom completely free. The center will include four reactors with a capacity of 1200 MW each. The reactors will cost $ 20 billion($ Bn) and Turkey will purchase electricity at a price of $ 0.1235 / kWh for 15 years under a guarantee payment contract of $ 71 billion. According to the Turkish Law, Environmental Impact Assessment Report (CED report) is required for projects which are known as environmentally affecting and they are listed in Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. Since nuclear power plant projects do require CED approval Rosatom applied to receive CED approval for Akkuyu but, only 10 days were given to public to review the contents of the CED which was about 3000 pages. Soon after the application was completed, Akkuyu CED report was approved by ministry immediately one month later when President Putin visited Turkey in December 2015. Later it was proved by antinuclear associations and lawyers that there were irregularities such as forgery on documents: signatures were forged twice at different stages of the project. President of Greens, Rebecca Harms from European Parliament raised their concern on this issue against Turkish Ministry of Energy through a letter written on 28 January 2015(this letter was translated and published in Turkish on Yesil Gazete). No explanation were made by Energy Ministry regarding this letter. Besides in June 2015 it was understood that Turkish Government have also been hiding International Atom Energy Agency (IAEA) study report since Turkey has not fulfilled many of the recommendations mentioned in it. Second, in May 2013, Turkish Government signed an agreement with Japan to have a nuclear power plant established in Sinop (Black Sea coast). Four ATMEA-1 reactors will be built by the joint venture between Areva and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and installed power capacity of this one will be 4400 MW (with each 1100MW 4 reactors). Cost of the investment were announced as $ 22 billion at first but after enrolment of Japanese companies to the project it is announced that it will cost 16 billion dollars. But even land licence has not been received as there has been no application for it yet. On the other hand, 99% of Sinop is forest and Hamsilos Natural Park supported by Unesco where there are unique species have been living is neighbourhood, nuclear power plant construction area is very close. The decision to build a nuclear power plant taken, the government seized 60 square kilometres of land previously under the authority of the Ministry of Forest and started clearing an area of 10 square kilometers with 225 thousand trees have been cut in the area. Nuclear power plant site is only 17 kliometers away from the city centre of Sinop where population is around 200 thousand people. Besides Black sea is well known in Turkish fisheries and provides 70% fish of Turkey in which 70% of all is received from Sinop. There is also an other nuclear power plant with 4 reactors have been considered to establish again in Sinop or in an other location called Igneada in Thrace ( in European continent of Turkey close to Bulgaria Border). But there has been no agreement for the 3rd one yet. Sometimes government use this issue to change the routine of daily news. But even it is so, antinuclear associations and public are very keen on resistance against any kind of plan such as nuclear or coal energy entrepreneurship in Igneada. Actually Igneda is a place where there are many species of both animals and plants, it is a swamp forest. Is nuclear energy really so essential for Turkey’s energy needs? Turkey’s yearly energy consumption is about 200 billion kwh/year. Altough Turkey is a country with a potential of 300 billion kwh/year solar power and this amount is twice of Germany’s solar power, solar energy production level in Turkey is only 1/10 of Germany’s solar power production. It is explained that in a year Germany receives sunshine for 1000 hours but Turkey receives it for 1700 hours. Despite renewables can create its autonomy and make a real change by bringing an end to dependency on oil and gas, Turkey insists on importing such “dirty energy”resources. According to the 2013 import data, Turkey is the 5th country in the world which is importing natural gas, the thirteenth within gas oil importers, the eight one within all coal importers in the world. About natural gas, I can say that 40% of Turkey’s energy consumption is dependent on to natural gas that is imported from Russia . According to Energy Report of Turkish Architects and Engineers Association (TMMOB) at the end of 2014 , Turkey provides 16% of its energy from hydraulic power. Number of active hydraulic dams are about 478 and still 534 dams have been planning . Turkey produce 48% of its energy from natural gas, 30% from coal, 3% from wind, 1% from geothermal and solar power. (TMMOB Energy Report ,2015 January (statistics from Turkey Electrics Public Company, TEIAS) This means that Turkey is violently damaging the environment in its lands by extremely increasing numbers of hydraulic dam plans. The amount of water that is left to prevent ecological damage known as “life line water” is not enough to feed its environment. Turkey is also keeping its dependency on fossil fuels. Both import of fossil fuels and its usage in huge amounts destroy the nature. As well as importing coal Turkey also export it by decreasing the amount of agricultural areas and having them changed to coal mines. Although there are many coal mines Turkey is not a country who completely adopt safety and environmental rules. Finally last year in May Turkey experienced a coal mine mortality accident and 301 employees were announced as “dead”, in fact number of dead people were supposed to be about 900 people . Has the Turkish government factored-in Fukushima? Was there an independent safety review after the accident in Japan? Last year in 2015 February, bureaucrats such as governor and municipality of Sinop Center visited Japan. Black Sea Regional Improvement Project (KUZKA) in Turkey provided a trip for the bureaucrats including Mayor of Sinop with their families. They spent around 1 week in Japan but we, as citizens were very lately informed about details of the trip and their meetings held with Japanese officers in Japan. What we know is, they were not allowed to visit any nuclear power plant in Japan due to safety rules. I have not heard any other visit performed by Turkish Government to examine Fukushima effects. The only visits were performed by our current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan or his group to Japan to fix matters on Sinop nuclear power plant deal or any other deal to shake hands or show kindness. How reliable are nuclear industry’s safety assurances in Turkey? Turkey is a country who signed Atom for Peace in 1955 as the first country in the world. In 1962 Turkish Atom Energy Agency were established for the first time but later it became Turkish Atomic Energy Institution (TAEK) in 1965 . Since then, Turkey have had the desire of establishing nuclear power plants strong and has tried bidding process 4 times but never succeeded (1965, 1972, 1982, 1993) to build a nuclear plant, but they were all resulted without success One reason to the failure was strong public opposition against nukes but there was also some other reasons such as political and economic crisis repeating every 10 year. Turkey does not have a good record about nuclear, including its ineffective response to the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Chernobyl Effects Turkey is one of the countries who have been suffering from Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986. The radioactive cloud from Chernobyl flew over Turkey for mainly ten days. Five days after the Chernobyl accident, the radiation Western Black Sea measured was 20 times higher than the norm, and it was 1000 times higher Thrace (Western Turkey) . Unfortunately iodine tablets were not distributed for the people of Black sea same as it was done for the people in Eastern Europe regions. Due to radioactive contamination of tea plant in 1986 in May 48,000 tons of tea widely contaminated with cesium-137 were mixed with 130 000 tons of previous year’s tea. In Turkey tea is consumed approximately 10 thousand tonnes of tea per year. Knowing that a packet of tea weighs 1 kilo, it means they drank a mixture contaminated for 13 years. “Everything is under control! Drink Tea and Eat nuts! Nuts also is a product of Blacksea. A little radiation is even good for health! “said Minister of Health to television after the Chernobyl accident. Three years after the first cases of cancer have appeared in the region of the Black Sea. 28 years later, the hospitals are still filled with people of cancer disease. In the 20 years since Chernobyl, the number of cancer cases has increased dramatically, especially in the Black Sea region , but no scientific studies in this area could be performed. Mortality accident in a country without nuclear power plant Although not possessing atomic power plant, Turkey has already undergone radiation accidents mortals. In December 1998, the radioactive material was thrown into a single discharge from a hospital. Turkish Atomic Energy Institution (TAEK) which was established to regulate radioactive issues in 1962 , was convicted for not inspecting the safety conditions of the hospital properly. There was one fatal case and it was estimated that 19 people were hospitalized within total 300 people who had radioactive illness. Lead factory causing cancer cases in Izmir In December 2012, another scandal has been revealed: An old lead factory, Aslan Avcı Ltd, was storing radioactive waste since 2007 in Izmir. Following the investigation of a journalist alerted by local residents who faced a resurgence cancer and malformations, Antinuclear Platform and the lawyers made scientific analysis and made public visits. TAEK did not accept its responsibility not to be guilty but confirmed that there has been radioactive pollution, and it will be cleaned up by May 2015. Unfortunately the company who was selected to make decontamination of radioactivity did not apply for CED and started its process without receiving CED approval although it is legally forced to do so, as a result radioactivity is spread into the air, soil,water and surroundings where people are living.The Gaziemir case is still at court to force the decontamination company to apply CED. Even Change.org campaign is released by opponents from public to avoid such radioactivity contamination. Moreover, the bay of Akkuyu marked for construction of a nuclear power plant is only 25 km from an active seismic fault. An earthquake of magnitude 7.5 occurred in Akkuyu in 1872. Today the situation is delicate when we know that he did not produce earthquake6-7 magnitude in the last half-millennium: this suggests that tensions have steadily accumulate within in this period. Another active fault starting from Mersin to the west, that of Kozan, joins the sea Akkuyu Bay.

#### Turkey’s a huge biodiversity hotspot.

Şekercioğlu 11 Çağan Şekercioğlu of University of Utah & KuzeyDoğa Society “Turkey’s Conservation Crisis: Global Biodiversity Hotspots Under Threat” December 31st 2011 National Geographic <http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2011/12/31/turkeys-globally-important-biodiversity-in-crisis/> JW

For me, 2011 started with a great post by David Braun, so I will thank him by ending the year with my first National Geographic piece, about my country Turkey (Türkiye). Turkey is the only country covered almost entirely by three of the world’s 34 global biodiversity hotspots: the Caucasus, Irano-Anatolian,and the Mediterranean. At the nexus of Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa, Turkey’s location, mountains, and its encirclement by three seas have resulted in spectacular biodiversity, making Turkey “the biodiversity superpower of Europe“. Of over 9000 known native vascular plant species, one third are endemic. Large carnivores such as brown bear, wolf, Caucasian lynx, caracal, striped hyena, and possibly even leopard, still roam the wild corners of this diverse country that covers 783,562 km2 and hosts 75 million people. Map of Turkey showing some of the key biodiversity areas Turkey’s Globally Important Biodiversity In Danger Two papers I published with my colleagues this month highlight Turkey’s growing conservation crisis, the worst in the country’s long and fascinating history. “Turkey’s globally important biodiversity in crisis“, our detailed review of Turkey’s biodiversity, habitats, and conservation issues was published in the December 2011 issue of the journal Biological Conservation. This comprehensive and up-to-date overview of Turkey’s natural wealth and environmental problems, elaborated below, has been engagingly summarized by the New York Times, and the Treehugger. [Image: Brown Bear, Kars] “Turkey’s rich natural heritage under assault“, published in Science last week, highlights the scale and extent of these threats, in particular all the environmental laws that were changed in the past two years to make it easier to replace Turkey’s crucial habitats and protected areas with mines, dams, tourist resorts, and other types of “development”. As Jennifer Hattam states, this “arbitrary, development-obsessed environmental policy-making is greatly threatening Turkey’s ecosystems“. Consequently, Turkey’s astonishing amount of biodiversity, especially for a temperate country of its size, is being destroyed rapidly, partially in the past decade during which “Turkey’s Great Leap Forward” has put the country at the risk of “cultural and environmental bankruptcy”. In addition, Turkey lacks the biological ‘‘charisma’’ of many tropical countries and suffers from the international misconception that, as a nation that wants to enter the European Union, it must have adequate funds and priorities to support conservation. These factors, combined with the Turkish public’s general disinterest in conservation and the government’s unrelenting ‘‘developmentalist obsession’’, have created a conservation crisis which began in the 1950s and has peaked in the past decade. With Turkey’s biodiversity facing severe and growing threats, especially from the government and business interests, the country is now entirely covered by crisis ecoregions, most of them critically endangered. Undammed Çoruh River, Artvin Turkey currently ranks 140th out of 163 countries in biodiversity and habitat conservation. Although Turkey’s total forest area increased by 5.9% since 1973, endemic-rich Mediterranean maquis, grasslands, coastal areas, wetlands, rivers, and even some old-growth forests are disappearing, while overgrazing and rampant erosion degrade steppes and rangelands. The current developmentalist obsession, particularly regarding water use, threatens to eliminate much of what remains, while forcing large-scale migration from rural areas to the cities. According to current plans, Turkey’s rivers and streams will be dammed with almost 4000 dams, diversions, and hydroelectric powerplants for power, irrigation, and drinking water by 2023. A dam being built on Çoruh River, Artvin Unchecked urbanization, dam construction, draining of wetlands, poaching, and excessive irrigation are the most widespread threats to biodiversity. Preserving Turkey’s remaining biodiversity will necessitate immediate action, international attention, greater support for Turkey’s developing conservation capacity, and the expansion of a nascent Turkish conservation ethic.

#### Hotspots are key to global biodiversity.

Conservation International 13 “Hotspots” 2013 http://www.conservation.org/how/pages/hotspots.aspx

Life on Earth faces a crisis of historical and planetary proportions. Unsustainable consumption in many northern countries and crushing poverty in the tropics are destroying wild nature. Biodiversity is besieged. Extinction is the gravest aspect of the biodiversity crisis: it is irreversible. While extinction is a natural process, human impacts have elevated the rate of extinction by at least a thousand, possibly several thousand, times the natural rate. Mass extinctions of this magnitude have only occurred five times in the history of our planet; the last brought the end of the dinosaur age. In a world where conservation budgets are insufficient given the number of species threatened with extinction, identifying conservation priorities is crucial. British ecologist Norman Myers defined the biodiversity hotspot concep**t** in 1988 to address[es] the dilemma that conservationists face: what areas are the most immediately important for conserving biodiversity? The biodiversity hotspots hold especially high numbers of endemic species, yet their combined area of remaining habitat covers only 2.3 percent of the Earth's land surface. Each hotspot faces extreme threats and has already lost at least 70 percent of its original natural vegetation. Over 50 percent of the world’s plant species and 42 percent of all terrestrial vertebrate species are endemic to the 34 biodiversity hotspots.

#### Every species loss pushes us closer to the brink.

Diner 94 David N. (Major, U.S. Army) "The Army and the Endangered Species Act: Who's Endangering Whom?" Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course (April 1994) www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA456541&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems are inherently more stable than less diverse systems: "'The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress...[l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." By causing widespread extinctions humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biological simplicity rises, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the U.S. are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse, and human extinction. Certainly, each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

#### Extinction.

Takacs 96 David (Environmental Humanities Prof @ CSU Monteray Bay) “The Idea of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradise” pg. 200-201 1996

So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs’ rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: “It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.” 13 Elsewhere Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion, loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's well¬stocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where can¬cer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that civili¬zation will disappear some time before the end of the next century - not with a bang but a whimper.

### Adv 2 = terrorism

#### Turkish nuclear power is uniquely vulnerable to terrorist attacks and materials can be stolen for dirty bombs.

Ergun et al 14 Doruk Ergun and Can Kasapoglu (research fellows at EDAM) “Securing Turkey’s Prospective Nuclear Energy Program: A Strategic Nuclear Security Risk Analysis” Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies \*\*the article doesn’t specify the date, but all the dates-accessed in the bibliography are from 2014, and the article doesn’t cite anything later than 2014 <http://edam.org.tr/document/NuclearBook3/edam_nucphysec2015_ch1.pdf> JW

In order to meet its rising energy demand and diversify energy sources, Ankara is intent on pursuing a peaceful nuclear energy program, which is planned to come online gradually in the next decade. Turkey, however, is a country in a dangerous neighborhood and continues to face internal and external threats emanating from both state and non-state actors. The nation’s prospective NPP may be attractive targets for its rivals in the region, their proxy terror organizations, or other terrorist and militant groups aiming to harm Turkey or access the sensitive materials and information that the NPP contains. Yet, as a late-comer to the nuclear scene, Turkey has the chance to tailor the safety and security measures of its planned NPPs from scratch. It can combine the expertise of other nuclear powers, NPP operators, and international organizations together with its experience combating state and non- state threats since the foundation of the country. This paper sought to highlight several areas governmental and non-governmental organizations should consider when undertaking this operation. There are a myriad of ways in which adversaries could threaten Turkey’s prospective nuclear program. These are not limited to the physical integrity of the NPPs. A hostile actor, state or non-state, may not be bold enough to attack an NPP directly but may prefer alternative ways, such as targeting nuclear fuel and radioactive waste (especially when in transit), sensitive information, and personnel. In some aspects, these can be far more vulnerable and more easily accessible than the reactor core. Therefore, the definition of threat extends beyond the facility site. As outlined in the insider threat section, securing a nuclear facility is a constant operation. Turkish authorities should therefore ensure that the security of NPP operations are effectively regulated, overseen, and inspected. Furthermore, both the definition of the threat and the envisioned security measures should be constantly reviewed and updated according to the domestic and international threat landscape. These security revisions should be done with the collaboration of relevant government agencies, first and foremost among them the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority; Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources; Ministry of National Defence; Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communication; Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Prime Minister’s Office; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Customs and Trade; National Intelligence Organization; and the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technologies. The Akkuyu and Sinop NPP sites mostly fall under the purview of the Gendarmerie General Command, which is a part of the Turkish General Staff but commanded by the Ministry of Interior. It should be executed with the combined effort of the Turkish National Police, Turkish General Staff and Gendarmerie General Command, and the National Intelligence Organization. Like securing a nuclear facility, defending a nuclear facility is also a constant operation. Both on-site and off-site security personnel should be trained to respond to a multiplicity of scenarios and tailor the defensive measures in the facility according to the threat landscape. Force-on-force exercises, in which attack scenarios are simulated by the inclusion of mock adversaries, prove to be valuable training methods for actual adversarial attacks. Furthermore these training and defensive measures should be reviewed periodically, not for the sake of fulfilling a bureaucratic requirement but for the sake of ensuring that the facilities are firmly guarded. While the rewards of successfully attacking an NPP may be high for adversaries, so are the risks both due to the multiplicity of security measures and the likelihood of a painful retaliation. It is therefore important to assume that potential adversaries understand the magnitude of the risks they are taking (i.e. understand the conditions of deterrence) and will prepare to overcome these risks accordingly. In other words, not all hunters will decide to go after the stag instead of the hare, but the ones that do will be sure to pack a gun. Nuclear Security: A Turkish Perspective / 40 Turkey is plagued with domestic and international terror organizations. These organizations have cooperated with each other on numerous occasions and may do so again in the future – especially when targeting a high profile target such as a nuclear power plant. The Akkuyu NPP will be particularly vulnerable to terror attacks due to its geographical proximity to the area of operation of most terror organizations listed above. Furthermore, terror organizations in Turkey have been used as proxies by state actors in the past and may be used again in the future to target the country’s NPPs. The rising profile of jihadist terror organizations – most notably ISIL – is especially worrisome for Ankara. In addition to the direct threat they pose to NPPs, they could also influence domestic terror organizations in Turkey that are empathetic to their cause. There are considerable numbers of Turkish citizens fighting alongside jihadists in Iraq and Syria, and their eventual return home will present further risks to the Turkish authorities. As noted earlier, Turkey’s critical energy infrastructure is not likely to face a state- led, conventional military threat. Nevertheless, ballistic missile proliferation could pose a threat, depending on the number, range, accuracy, and mobility. Moreover, WMD warheads could bring the risk of contamination, which would alter the threat calculus drastically. The overall geopolitical picture is critical as it might deeply influence Ankara’s potential and actual competitors in their conduct against Turkey’s critical energy infrastructure. Both due to the potentially catastrophic results of a successful attack may have and due to their nature as critical parts of national infrastructure, ensuring the safety and security of NPPs, the buck cannot be passed solely to the project companies. As mentioned in Akkuyu NPP EIA, the Turkish state and its agencies are responsible for setting up a security regime for NPPs, tasking an agency or organization to prepare an emergency response plan which includes ways in which sabotage, theft, intrusion, terrorist attacks, threats or other malicious attempts are to be responded to, responding to potential emergencies from such adversarial actions, and drawing procedures for training security personnel220. While it is the responsibility of the project company to ensure the safety and security of the NPP site, prepare and implement on-site emergency response plans, disseminate information on these tasks to relevant governmental agencies and coordinate their efforts with the government’s security forces, setting criteria, regulating and inspecting these defensive measures are also the responsibilities of the government. The EIA furthermore states that “preparing and executing defense plans for non-nuclear accidents or criminal actions (theft, sabotage, terrorist attacks or threats of terrorist attacks etc.) are to be done by respective governmental agencies and organizations”.221 Moreover, both emergency response and defense functions must and shall be coordinated with respective governmental agencies, requiring the government to be active in dividing tasks and authorities to its respective agencies to ensure the orderly cooperation and coordinating between the project companies and its agencies. For these reasons, the Turkish leadership must draw up separate design basis threats for its prospective NPPs in a way that ensures that all of the aforementioned elements are incorporated and site specific risks and conditions are taken into account. It should also ensure that on-site and off-site security forces are properly trained and force-on-force exercises for multiple attack scenarios are regularly conducted. The aforementioned threats are not imminent, as the construction of the facilities has not commenced, and therefore there is no need for urgent action in these regards. However, there is dire need for preparatory action since NPPs present a set of unique challenges and any successful attack may have disastrous consequences. Ankara should make proper use of the ample time in its hands to tailor its precautionary measures and augment its capabilities based on a realistic understanding of the threat landscape that the country is faced with.

#### Terrorism is the most likely existential threat.

Rhodes 9 Richard (a visiting scholar at Harvard and MIT, and currently he is an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Rhodes is the author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986), which won the Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, National Book Award, and National Book Critics Circle Award) “Reducing the nuclear threat: The argument for public safety” December 14th 2009 JW

The response was very different among nuclear and national security experts when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed PDF them in 2005. This group of 85 experts judged that the possibility of a WMD attack against a city or other target somewhere in the world is real and increasing over time. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by 2015 doubled to 20 percent median. There was strong, though not universal, agreement that a nuclear attack is more likely to be carried out by a terrorist organization than by a government. The group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or manufacture one after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem," Lugar wrote in the report's introduction. "It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. "The bottom line is this," Lugar concluded: "For the foreseeable future, the United States and other nations will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." It's paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators. That response would surely initiate a new round of nuclear armament and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq, that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.